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THE SIMPLEST TEST OF
INFLATION TARGET CREDIBILITY
ABSTRACT
A simple test of inflation target credibility is constructed by subtracting the maximum and
minimum inflation rates consistent with the inflation targets from the yields to maturity on
nominal bonds. This results in a target-consistent range of real yields on nominal bonds. If
expected real yields, or market real interest rates on real bonds if such are available, fall outside
the range of target-consistent real yields, credibility is rejected. Two concepts of credibility,
called absolute credibility and credibility in expectation, are distinguished. The inflation targets
of Canada, New Zealand and Sweden are examined with convenient diagrams over yields to
maturityand forwardinterest rates.
Lars E. 0. Svensson




and NBER2.1. The test with a market for real bonds
If there exists a well-functioning market for real bonds with reliable market quotations
of real interest rates, the test consists of examining whether the market real interest
rate of the given maturity falls between the target-consistent minimum and maximum
real yields. If the market real interest rate falls outside the range between the target-
consistent minimum and maximum real yields, absolute credibility can be rejected. This
is so, because if there were absolute credibility, market agents would believe that the real
yields to maturity on a nominal bond would with 100percentprobability fall between
the target consistent real yields. Then there would be a safe minimum positive profit
from borrowing real and lending nominal (if the market real interest rate on real bonds
would fall below the target-consistent minimum real yield on nominal bonds), or lending
real and borrwing nominal (if the market real interest rate would fall above the target-
consistent maximum real yield). That would not be consistent with an equilibrium in a
well-functioning capital market.
If the market real interest rate falls outside the range between the target-consistent
minimum and maximum real yields, credibility in expectation can also be rejected, if the
inflation risk premium is small. The inflation risk premium is the difference between the
expected real yield to maturity on a nominal bond and the market real interest rate on a
real bond. Therefore a small inflation risk premium means that the expected real yields
on a nominal bond is approximately equal to the market real interest rate and hence out-
side the range between the target-consistent minimum and maximum real yields. Since
the expected real yield to maturity on a nominal bond equals the difference between the
nominal yield to maturity and the expected inflation rate to maturity, it must then be
the case that the expected inflation rate falls outside the target inflation range. Finally,
the inflation risk premium should indeed be small under credibility in expectation. The
inflation risk premium is, according to standard portfolio theory, determined by the con-
ditional variance of the inflation rate and the conditional covariance between the inflation
rate and other risks (see for instance Svensson (1993c)). It is likely that credibility in
expectation is associated with a small conditional variance and hence a small conditional
covariance of the inflation rate. This implies a small inflation risk premium. In sum-
mary, if the market real interest rate on real bonds falls outside the range between the
target-consistent minimum and maximum real yields on nominal bonds, not only absolute
credibility but also credibility in expectation should be rejected.
If the market real interest rate falls between the target-consistent minimum and maxi-
2mum real yields to maturity, it does not follow that absolute credibility should be accepted,
since nothing prevents market agents from still assigning some positive probability to fu-
ture inflation rates falling outside the target range. Credibility in expectation should be
accepted, though, by the same argument about the inflation risk premium as above.
2.2. The test without a market for real bonds
If thereis nowell-functioning market for real bonds, so there are no reliable market real
interest rates, the credibility test is not quite as simple. It then consists of judging whether
or not it is likely that market agents' expected future real yield fall between the target-
consistent minimum and maximum real yields. This judgment will then have to rely on
other available information, including past ex post real yields. If it is considered very likely
that expected future yield falls outside the range between the target-consistent minimum
and maximum real yields, absolute credibility and credibility in expectation should be
rejected. If it is considered very likely that the expected future yields fall between the
target-consistent minimum and maximum real yields, credibility in expectation should be
accepted, but not necessarily absolute credibility.
2.3. The test with forward rates
The test can also be done for forward interest rates. For forward rates the target-consistent
minimum and maximum real forward rates are constructed by subtracting from nominal
forward rates the maximum and minimum target inflation rates for the relevant future
period. If there is a market for real bonds, and reliable (implied) market real forward
rates are available, the test consists of examining whether the market real ibrward rates
fall within the target-consistent minimum and maximum real forward rates. If there are
no reliable market real forward rates, the test consists of judging whether or not it is
likely that market agents' expected real forward rates fall between the target-consistent
minimum and maximum real forward rates.
Next I shall examine three examples of inflation targets, namely those of Canada, New
Zealand and Sweden.3
31t might appear that the United Kingdom would be an ideal example to examine with the simplest
test. The U.K. announced inflation targets in October 1992 (Bank of England (1993a)). The U.K. is also
one of the few countries that has a market for index bonds, so market real interest rates could potentially
be used with the test. A closer look reveals that U.K. is less suitable for the test, though. First, the
inflation target is rather wide, ranging from I to 4 percent per year. Second, the inflation target is
formally only "for the duration of this parliament," and formally not long-run commitment. Third, the
33. Example 1: Canada
Bank of Canada announced inflation targets in February 1991 (Bank of Canada (1991a,b)):
The 1-year inflation rate should reach 3 percent per year by the end of 1992, 2.5percent
per year by mid 1994, and 2 percent per year by the end of 1995. A target range of
percentage points per year around these target levels was also specified.
The test of inflation target credibility for Canada is illustrated for a 5-year horizon
in Figure Ia. The parallel curves with long dashes at the bottom of the graphstarting
in February 1991 show the target-consistent (TC) maximum and minimum future5-year
inflation rates.4 The dotted curve shows the 1-year inflation rate (thepercentage increase
in the price level over the previous 12 months). The 1-year inflation ratecame down
rapidly towards the end of 1991 and even fell below the targetrange of 2-4 percent
per year for part of 1992. The curve at the top of the graph with short dashes shows
the interest rate on Canadian government bonds with a maturity ofapproximately 5
years. The target-consistent maximum and minimum real 5-year yields are shown by the
parallel solid curves; they are constructed by subtracting the target-consistent maximum
and minimum 5-year target inflation rates from the 5-year interest rate. Wesee that the
target-consistent minimum real 5-year yield was around 5.5 percentper year in February
1991 and that it has since fluctuated quite a bit but shown a downward trendand fallen
below 5 percent per year after mid 1992. In the second half of 1993 thetarget-consistent
real 5-year rate fell below 4 percentper year.
If there were a well-functioning market for 5-year real bonds in Canadathe test of
construction of the British index-linked gills is not designed foreasy extraction of real interest rates.
Semiannual coupons are indexed to the price level 8 months prior to thecoupon payment. The same
8-month lag applies to the principal. This makes the real value of theprincipal and the coupon payments
a function of the inflation rate that occurs during the 8 months prior to thepayment. Furthermore,
differential tax treatment between conventional and index-linkedgUts complicate matters. Capital gains
on British gills are exempt from capital gains taxes. The scalingup of the principal of index-linked gilts is
considered a capital gain and hence not taxed. Conventionalgills provide this compensation for expected
inflation through higher coupons. Couponpayments are taxed, though. This gives a tax advantage to
low-coupon index-linked gills over high-coupon conventional gills. Under theassumption that the post-
tax return on conventional and index-linked gills are equalized, the differencesin the pre-tax return will
depend on the marginal tax rate of the marginal investor, as will the calculations ofreal interest rates.
The difference between real interest rates calculated with andwithout consideration of taxes can the
several percentage points per annum. The uncertainty about themarginal tax rate of the marginal
Investor then unfortunately makes estimate, of U.K. real interest ratesuncertain. Woodward (1990)
discusses in detail and estimate, marginal taxrates, pie and poet-tax nominal and real interest rates,
and inflation expectations for the period 1982-2989. See alsothe discussion in Bank of England (1993b).
4The maximum i-year inflation rates has heen setto 6 percent per year for 199i, 4 percent per year for 1992 and 1993, 3.5 percentper year for 1994, and 3 percent per year for 1995 onwards. The minimum
1-year inflation rates are 2 percentage pointsper year below the maximum rates.
4inflation target credibility would simply consist of examining whether market real interest
rates would fall between the target-consistent minimum and maximum real yields. Absent
such a market5 we have to judge whether it is likely that expected real 5-year yields on
Canadian government bonds could sometimes be so high as 5 or 6 percent per year.
Expected real returns are according to conventional wisdom usually lower, say between 1
and 4 percent per year.
What have ex post real yields been? In Figure lb the curve showing the 1-year past
inflation rate has been removed. Instead the dotted line shows the realized future 5-year
inflation rate. It ends in August 1988 since the latest observations in the dataset of the
price level are from August 1993. Subtracting this inflation rate from the 5-year interest
rate results in the ex post real 5-year yield shown by the solid curve ending in late 1988.
For the period shown the ex post real yield has fluctuated between 4 and 9 percent per
year, and its mean is quite high, 6.3 percent per year. Without further information it
seems that we cannot exclude that expected real 5-year yields on Canadian bonds may be
of the same magnitude as the target-consistent minimum real yield. Therefore, without
further information inflation target credibility cannot be rejected for Canada. Neither
can it be accepted, since we cannot exclude that expected real yields may indeed be lower
than the target-consistent minimum real yield.
4. Example 2: New Zealand
Reserve Bank of New Zealand announced inflation targets in February 1991 (Reserve
Bank of New Zealand (1992)): 2.5-4.5 percent per year for 1991, 1.5-3.5 percent per year
for 1992, and 0-2 percent per year from the end of 1993.
In Figure Pa, the analog of Figure la, the parallel curves with long dashes show
the corresponding target-consistent maximum and minimum 5-year inflation rates. The
dotted curve shows the 1-year past inflation rate; the curve with short dashes shows the
interest rate on 5-year government bonds. The parallel solid curves show the target-
consistent minimum and maximum real yields. They show a strong downward trend. In
February 1991 the target-consistent minimum real yield was almost 9 percent per year;
in mid 1993 it had fallen below 5 percent per year. This is still a bit high compared to
conventional-wisdom real returns between 1 and 4 percent per year.
5Alonger real bond, maturing in year 2021, hasbeenemitted in Canada, but there is no 5-year real
bond, as far as! know.
5Absent market real interest rates on real bonds, we have to judge whether expected real
yields on nominal bonds might fall between the target-consistent minimum and maximum
real yields. What have ex post real yields been? The dotted and solid curves in Figure
2b ending in mid 1988 show the future 5-year inflation rate and the ex post 5-year read
yield, respectively. The ex post real 5-year yield in 1987 and 1988 was extremely high,
between 10 and 13 percent per year. This occurred during a rapid disinflation period (see
the1-yearinflation rate in Figure 2a), so it is likely that ex post real yields were higher
thanpreviouslyexpecteçl real yields.
It seems unlikely that the inflation target was credible in February 1991 when the
target-consistent minimum real yield was as high as 9 percent per year. The strong
downward trend and the much lover target-consistent minimum real yield below 5 percent
per year in mid 1993 makes it more likely that inflation target credibility cannot be
rejected by then, or at least that inflation target credibility soon can probably no longer
be rejected.
5. Example 3: Sweden
Sveriges Riksbank announced inflation targets in January 1993 (Sveriges Riksbank (1993)),
namely that the 1-year inflation rate shall fall between 1 and 3 percent per year from 1995
onwards. For 1993 and 1994 the R.iksbank has not announced any explicit target but re-
ferred to the Government's announcement in December 1992 that inflation for 1993 above
5 percent per year "cannot be tolerated." Let me interpret this as meaning that the max-
imum target inflation rate is 5 percent per year for 1993. For 1994 it is set to 4percent
per year, the midpoint between the maximum rates for 1993 and for 1995. The minimum
target inflation rate is set to 2 percentage points per year below the maximum target rate.
Figure Sa is analogous to Figures la and 2a. The curves showing the target-consistent
maximum and minimum 5-year inflation rates and the target-consistent minimum and
maximum real yields are much shorter since they start only in January 1993. In early
1993 the target-consistent maximum and minimum 5-year inflation rates were 3.6 and L6
percent per year, respectively. The 1-year inflation rate, shown by the dotted curve, has
fluctuated between 3 and 12 percentper year since 1984. It caine down rapidly in early
1992 towards 2 percent per year. After the float and depreciation of the krona beginning
in November 1992 the 1-year inflation rate has risen toagain to about percent per year
in early 1993 but then come down to below 45percent per year in September 1993.
The target-consistent minimum real 5-year yield was about 6percent per year in early
61993, about the same level as for Canada when Bank of Canada announced its inflation
targets in February 1991 and it fell to about 4 percent per year in the fall of 1993. Is it
likely that expected real 5-year yields on Swedish government bonds could be as high as
around 4 percent? The future 5-year inflation rate and ex post real 5-year yield is shown
in Figure 36.Theex post real yield fluctuated between 2 and 8.5 percent per year during
the period shown, with a mean of 5.4 percent per year, clearly above the same magnitude
as the target-consistent minimum real 5-year yield in the fall of 1993. An expected real 5-
year yield of 4 percent is in the high range according to conventional wisdom, but without
further information it seems that inflation target credibility in expectation cannot be
rejected. Absolute credibility can be rejected, though, since with the expected real 5-year
yield at best near the minimum target-consistent real yield, certainly some probability
must be attached to the inflation rate falling outside the target range.
5.1. The yield curve
Some further information is however provided by the full term structure of interest rates
for Sweden. In Figure 4a the curve with short dashes shows the nominal spot rate curve
(nominal zero-coupon yield curve) for Sweden on the trade date August 18, 1993 (ex-
pressed as annually compounded yields to maturity and plotted against the maturity
date). The spot rate curve has been estimated from Swedish Treasury bill rates and gov-
ernment bond yields.° The curves with long dashes show the target-consistent maximum
and minimum target inflation rates from August 1993 to the maturity dates. The target-
consistent maximum inflation rate starts out at 5 percent per year for 1993 and then
falls gradually towards 3 percent per year. Since it is the average of the maximum target
inflation rates for each year from 1993 onwards, it approaches the 3 percent per year level
only asymptotically. The solid curves show the target-consistent minimum and maximum
real yields, the real yields resulting from subtracting the target-consistent maximum and
minimum target inflation rates from the spot rate curve.
The target-consistent minimum real yield to maturity falls to less than 3 percent for
bonds and treasury bills maturing in 1994 and then rises to about 3.6 percent per year
for bonds maturing in 1998, that is, in 5-years. The latest observations in Figures 3a and
3b are from September 1993. The observation from August 1993 in Figures 3a and 3b
6Since coupon bond yields depend on the coupon, the standard yield curve is an ambiguous indicator
of theterm structure ofinterest rate. The zero-couponrates havebeen estimated with the functional
form of NelsonandSiegel (1987).SeeDahiquistand Svensson(1993)orSvensson (1993b)for details.
7should correspond approximately to that in Figure 4a for maturity in August 1998.' For
maturities past year 2000 the target-consistent minimum real yield rises above 4 percent
per year, which is on the borderline of being high.
5.2. The forward rate curve
The forward rate curve extracts additional information from the spot rate curve. The
curve with short dashes in Figure 4b shows the overnight forward interest rates implied by
the spot rate curve of Figure 4a. An overnight forward rate is an interest rate determined
on the trade day for an investment that starts at a future date, the settlement date, and
ends one day later, the maturity date. The forward rates in Figure 4b are for the trade
date August 18, 1993, expressed as annually compounded rates and plotted against the
settlement date.
The curves with long dashes in Figure 4b show the maximum and minimum 1-year
target inflation rates plotted against each year (rather than the target-consistent average
maximum and minimum inflation rates to maturity in Figure 4a). Subtracting these in-
flation rates from the nominal forward rates results in the target-consistent minimum and
maximum real forward rates. These are shown by the solid lines. The target-consistent
minimum real forward rate rises from below 2.5 percentper year in 1994 to almost 6
percent per year after year 2000. It seems unlikely that market agents' expected marginal
real rate of return from lengthening an investment beyond 2000 could beas high as 6 per-
cent per year. Therefore it seems that inflation target credibility in August 1993 (absolute
and in expectation) must indeed be rejected.
5.3. Survey data on inflation expectations
Finally, when survey data on inflation expectations are available, the easiest test of in-
flation target credibility is of course to directlycompare these inflation expectations with
the target-consistent maximum and minimum inflationrates, although there are some
7The correspondence is not exactsincethe interest rate in Figures 3a and 3b is a monthly average of
a yieldto maturity on a couponbond, whereas the yield curve in Figure 4a is for a particular date and
forazero-coupon bond.
8Aforwardrate can be seen as the increase in the total return to a spot investment from a marginal
lengthening of the investment period. Therefore forward rates and spot rates are related as marginal and
average cost, and the forward yield curve and the spot yield curve are related as marginal and average cost
curves. See Shiller (1990)fordeflnitiop.s and a discussion of forward rates, and see $vensson (1993a,b) for
a recent discussion of the use of forward rates to extract expectations of future interestrates, inflation
and currency depreciation.
8well-known general problems with usingsurvey data on expectations. A survey of the
inflation expectations of the largest Swedish andforeign investors on the Swedish bond
market has been made each quarter since February 1991by Aragors Securities Fondkoni-
mission AB. The investors are asked about theirexpected 2 and 5-year Swedish inflation
rates. According to the survey on August 18, 1993, themean expected 2 and 5-year
inflation rates were 3.3 and 4.0 percentper year, respectively (Aragon (1993)).
In Figure 5a Aragon's time series of 5-year inflationexpectations has been added to
Figure 3b (the thin solid curve). We see that the expected5-year inflation rate exceeds
the target-consistent maximum inflation rateby about 1 percentage pointper year in
early 1993, but that the distance to that inflation rate has fallenduring the rest of 1993.
In Figure 56 the expected inflation rates ofAugust 18, 1993, have been plotted against
August 1994 and August 1998 (the thin solid curve) and addedto the graphs of Figure
4a. (The observation for August 1993 is thepast 1-year inflation in August, 4.8 percent
per year.) We see that the expected inflation rate (from August1993) to August 1995 is
below the maximum target-consistent inflationrate to that month, whereas the expected
inflation rate to August 1998 is about 0.5percentage points above the maximum target
inflation rate to that month. Absolute credibility andcredibility in expectation is therefore
rejected for the 5-year horizon, but not for the 2-year horizon.
The corresponding expected real yields tomaturity on August 18, 1993, are given by
the vertical difference between the yieldcurve and the expected inflation curve in Figure
5b. The expected real yields are 3-3.5 percentper year for 2 and 5-years maturity, roughly
2 percentage points below the mean expost 5-year yields reported above.
From the observations of the expected inflation rates itfollows that the expected
"forward" inflation rate from August 1995 toAugust 1998 is 4.5 percent per year, higher
than the expected inflation rate of 4.0percent per year from August 1993 to August
1995. The thin solid curve in Figure Sc shows theseexpected forward inflation rates,
plotted against the midpoints of the period to whichthey refer (August 1994 being the
midpoint of August 1993-August 1995, February 1997being the midpoint of August 1995-
August 1998). The expected inflation rate from August 1995to August 1998 exceeds the
maximum target inflation rate for thoseyears by 1.5 percentage points. The corresponding
expected real forward rates are about 3 percentper year for 1994 through 1996.10
9We have ((5 yrs .4.O%/yr)-(2yrs -3.3%/yr)]/(3yrs)4.S%Jyr. '°This indicates that the assumption of anexpected future real interest rate equal to 4 percentper year thatisused in extracting inflation expectations from forwardrates in Svensson (1993a) is unlikely to be an Overestimate.
96. Summary and Conclusions
Two concepts of credibility, called absolute credibility and credibility in expectation, can
be distinguished.A simple testof inflation target credibility has been demonstrated,
namely to subtract from the nominal interest rate the target-consistent range of inflation
rates to the corresponding maturity. This results in a target-consistent range of real
yields to the relevant maturity. If market real interest rates on real bonds are available,
the test is simply to examine whether or not the market real interest falls within the
target-consistent range of real yields. Without market real interest rates, the test consists
of judging whether or not expected real yields are likely to fall within the target-consistent
range of real yields. The test can be done on time series data for a particular maturity, on
the yield curve for a particular trade date, or on the forward rate curve for a particular
trade date. If survey data on inflation expectations are available, the easiest test is to
simply compare these with the target-consistent range of inflation rates.
A brief examination of the credibility of the inflation targets of Canada, New Zealand
and Sweden is inconclusive for Canada, tends to reject inflation target credibility for the
early period of inflation targeting for New Zealand but not reject credibility after mid
1992, and currently rejects credibility for the recent inflation targets for Sweden (on a
5-year horizon but not on a 2-year horizon). That inflation target credibility is currently
rejected for Sweden should perhaps not be surprising: the experiences of Canada and New
Zealand indicate that some time may be needed after the inflationtargets are announced
to achieve credibility.
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